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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between individuals’ locus of control and their savings 
behavior, i.e. wealth accumulation, savings rates, and portfolio choices. Locus of control is a 
psychological concept that captures individuals’ beliefs about the controllability of life events 
and is a key component of self-control. We find that households with an internal reference 
person save more both in terms of levels and as a percentage of their permanent incomes. 
Although the locus-of-control gap in savings rates is largest among rich households, the gap 
in wealth accumulation is particularly large for poor households. Finally, households with an 
internal reference person and average net worth hold significantly less financial wealth, but 
significantly more pension wealth, than otherwise similar households with an external 
reference person. 
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1 Introduction
Governments increasingly regard households’ savings rates, asset portfolios, and wealth
levels as key targets for public policy intervention. The United States, for example,
has explicitly made asset accumulation a key component of its antipoverty strategy
(Sherraden, 1991; Beverly & Sherraden, 1999), while many countries are striving to
increase the incentives for personal savings in an effort to ensure that the elderly have
adequate resources in retirement (e.g. Hubbard et al., 1994). The range of policy
options being considered and adopted has expanded as economists’ understanding of
savings behavior has evolved. Most important has been the introduction of “temp-
tation” and “self-control” into economic models of inter-temporal decision making,
in particular consumption and savings decisions (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Shefrin &
Thaler, 1988; Levin, 1998). The key implication of these expanded, behavioral models
is that revealed preferences no longer necessarily equal normative preferences opening
the door for paternalistic regulation to help people avoid choices that they will later
regret (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004;
Kooreman & Prast, 2010; Bernheim et al., 2013).1
The goal of this paper is to contribute to this emerging policy debate by empirically
analyzing the link between individuals’ locus of control and their savings behavior.
Locus of control is a psychological concept capturing individuals’ beliefs about the
extent to which they control the events that affect them. Those with an external locus
of control generally attribute life’s outcomes to external factors (e.g. fate, luck, other
people, etc.) while those with an internal locus of control believe that much of what
happens in life stems from their own actions (Gatz & Karel, 1993). Importantly, an
internal locus of control is a key component of having greater self-control more broadly
(Rosenbaum, 1980). Despite a growing recognition that self-control is important in
allowing individuals to avoid immediate temptation and achieve their long-term goals,
there is little empirical evidence that links measures of self-control to economic well-
being generally.
1In contrast, neoclassical models typically point to better information or the elimination of capital
market imperfections as the primary options for enhanced savings policy.
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We investigate the relationship between locus of control and households’ saving
behavior – as reflected in their wealth accumulation, savings rates, and the way they
hold their wealth across asset types – using panel data from the Household, Income
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. HILDA data are ideal for our
purposes because they provide extremely detailed measures of both assets and fi-
nancial liabilities for a large, nationally-representative sample of households at three
separate points in time. The ability to directly examine savings behavior using a lon-
gitudinal measure of household wealth accumulation is quite rare in the international
context (Bloxham & Bett, 2009). Moreover, the data contain detailed measures of
locus of control and allow us to control for a range of factors, including other non-
cognitive skills, which may be related to savings behavior. Thus, we are able to assess
the role that perceptions of control play in wealth formation – a key component of
overall economic well-being – in a way that cannot be done with other data sources.
A deeper understanding of the link between locus of control and wealth accumulation
is fundamental to the development of policy initiatives to support households’ savings
behavior.
We find that households in which the reference person has an internal locus of
control save more both in terms of levels and as a percentage of their permanent
incomes than do households with external reference persons. The locus-of-control
gap in savings rates is largest among rich households. Despite this, the gap in wealth
accumulation associated with locus of control is particularly important for poor house-
holds at the bottom of the wealth distribution. Finally, locus of control is also related
to the way that equally wealthy households allocate their wealth across asset types.
Households with an internal reference person and average net worth hold significantly
less financial wealth, but significantly more pension wealth, than otherwise similar
households with an external reference person.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the theoretical
underpinnings of behavioral savings models and review the limited evidence linking
locus of control to savings decisions. Our data, estimation sample, variable specifica-
tion, and descriptive statistics are outlined in Section 3. The estimation strategy is
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presented in Section 4 and results can be found in Section 5. Finally, we present our
conclusions and suggestions for future research in Section 6.
2 Locus of Control and Savings Decisions
Neoclassical models of consumer behavior – for example, Modigliani & Brumberg’s
(1954) life-cycle theory of saving or Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis (1957) –
model consumer behavior as the outcome of an optimization problem in which lifetime
expected utility is maximized subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint and the
available information set. Such models have been the backbone of most economic
analysis of consumption and savings decisions for decades. Yet there has also been
extensive debate about whether or not the predictions of life-cycle models do, in fact,
characterize household behavior.2 Shefrin & Thaler (1988, pg. 611) were among the
first to argue that “a model of saving that omits temptation is misspecified”. They in-
stead put forward a ‘behavioral life-cycle hypothesis’ in which willpower represents the
psychic cost associated with exercising the self-control necessary to resist immediate
gratification and achieve long-term savings goals.
In contrast to neoclassical models, behavioral life-cycle theory emphasizes the
importance of mental accounting, framing, and self-control in understanding inter-
temporal savings decisions. Mental accounting, for example, allows individuals to
resist temptation by treating various components of their wealth as non-fungible (e.g.
Shefrin & Thaler, 1988; Thaler, 1990; Levin, 1998; Graham & Isaac, 2002). Marginal
propensities to consume can, therefore, depend on how wealth is “framed”, i.e. how it
is allocated across assets with different degrees of temptation (Levin, 1998). Mental
accounting and framing assist individuals in maintaining self-control. In the litera-
ture, self-control problems are typically modeled in one of two ways. The first is in
the context of time-inconsistent (i.e. present-biased) preferences (see Laibson, 1997;
O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999; DellaVigna, 2009; Mastrobuoni & Weinberg, 2009). The
2For a sense of this debate see Shefrin & Thaler (1988), Browning & Crossley (2001), and DellaV-
igna (2009).
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second relies on the dual preference structure proposed by Thaler & Shefrin (1981) in
which an individual is at any point in time assumed to be both a farsighted planner
and a myopic doer.
Behavioral savings theory has given rise to a new generation of empirical studies
that seek to understand the relationship between cognitive and non-cognitive skills,
on the one hand, and savings patterns, on the other. Zagorsky (2007), for example,
finds that although individuals with higher IQs earn more, having a higher IQ does not
necessarily result in greater wealth and can sometimes increase the probability of being
in financial difficulty. Less numerate individuals, however, do appear to have lower
wealth levels (Banks & Oldfield, 2007) and be more likely to make financial mistakes
(Agarwal & Mazumder, 2013). Cognitive ability is also associated with having more
patience and a greater willingness to take risks (Dohmen et al., 2010). As both can
can be directly linked to portfolio decisions, it is perhaps not surprising that the
propensity to hold risky assets increases with numeracy, verbal fluency, memory, and
IQ even after accounting for education (Christelis et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2010;
Grinblatt et al., 2011).3 On balance, however, any differences in asset accumulation
do not necessarily translate into larger falls in post-retirement incomes, consumption
levels, or well-being for those with a lack of numerical skills (Banks et al., 2010).4
The more limited empirical literature on the relationship between non-cognitive
skills and savings patterns has generally focused on the role of personality as mea-
sured by the Big Five taxonomy.5 Boyce & Wood (2011), for example, find that the
marginal utility of income depends on personality traits. Given this, it is not surprising
that outcomes resulting from savings and consumption decisions can be linked to per-
sonality. Specifically, openness to experience and extraversion influence the amount
3See Curcuru et al. (2009) for a review of the literature on heterogeneity in asset portfolios.
4There is also a related literature which finds that financial literacy is associated with greater
wealth, more stock holding, and a greater likelihood of planning for retirement (see Lusardi &
Mitchell, 2007, 2008; van Rooij et al., 2011; Jappelli & Padula, 2013). Financial literacy, however,
is best viewed as an important human capital investment rather than an innate trait (see Jappelli
& Padula, 2013). In particular, Lusardi et al. (2013) argue that endogenous investments in financial
knowledge have the potential to explain a large proportion of the inequality in wealth.
5The Big Five taxonomy classifies individuals by the degree to which they exhibit five personality
traits: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism (see
Goldberg, 1992 and the references therein, especially Tupes & Christal, 1961 and Norman, 1963).
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of unsecured debt and financial assets held by individuals (Brown & Taylor, 2011).
Conscientiousness is associated with more retirement saving, while agreeableness is
associated with less (Duckworth & Weir, 2011).
There is virtually no literature linking locus of control to savings behavior. This
is surprising, because locus of control is a component of self-control more generally
(Rosenbaum, 1980).6 We are aware of only one study that directly investigates the
relationship between perceptions of control and savings behavior. Specifically, Chat-
terjee et al. (2011) analyze NLSY data and find that, among primary earners in their
30s and 40s, higher self-efficacy (locus of control) is related to greater wealth creation
and a higher propensity to hold financial assets. We expand on the work of Chatter-
jee et al. (2011) in several key ways. In particular, we examine the savings behavior
of couple-headed households – across the entire age spectrum – conditional on the
characteristics of both partners. This focus on households rather than individuals is
likely to be important given the public-good nature of families’ most important asset:
housing. In addition, we analyze the relationship between locus of control and savings
at multiple points of the unconditional savings distribution in order to assess whether
locus of control has similar effects on poor and wealthy households’ savings behavior.
Finally, we assess the role of locus of control in shaping asset portfolios (conditional on
net worth) by estimating a system of asset equations with cross-equation restrictions
imposed to ensure that the adding-up requirement is met (see Blau & Graham, 1990).
This is a substantial improvement over research that examines individual assets in
isolation.
3 Data
Our analysis relies on data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in
Australia (HILDA) Survey, a nationally representative household panel study. The
HILDA Survey began in 2001 with 7,682 households (19,914 individuals) and was
6There is a rapidly growing literature that links locus of control to numerous economic out-
comes including earnings, unemployment, educational attainment, life satisfaction, and investments
in health (see Cobb-Clark & Schurer, 2013; Cobb-Clark et al., 2014, and the references therein).
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extended by an additional 2,153 households (5,477 individuals) in 2011. Interviews
were conducted annually with all adult members (aged 15 years and above) of the
household on a broad range of core issues including labor market outcomes, family
dynamics, as well as economic and social well-being. The Survey contains rotating
modules on selected topics, including wealth and non-cognitive skills, in certain years
(Summerfield et al., 2012). Specifically, HILDA includes wealth modules in 2002,
2006, and 2010, which are designed to provide detailed measures of households’ assets
and liabilities.
We are particularly interested in wealth accumulation as a measure of savings,
and restrict our analysis to couples who stay together for at least four years, i.e. over
the time period 2002-2006, or 2006-2010, or both. We define the reference person
to be the partner with the most internal locus of control and restrict our analysis to
households in which the reference person is between 25 and 75 years old.7
We further restrict our sample to households with positive wealth levels, which
allows us to use log transformations of wealth in our analysis.8 Finally, we exclude
about 12 percent of the couples meeting these sample restrictions due to missing
information on at least one of our variables of interest. The resulting estimation
sample contains 1,903 couples in 2006 and 1,892 couples in 2010.
3.1 Wealth and Asset Measures
Our measure of wealth – total net worth – is derived from detailed measures of assets
and liabilities that are collected at the household level (see Headey, 2003). We have
information on five broad asset types including financial wealth, business equity, real
estate equity, vehicles, and pensions. Specifically, net financial wealth is defined as
the sum of total interest earning assets in banks and other institutions, total stocks
and mutual funds, and total other investments (life insurances, trust funds, and col-
7We also performed our analysis using the main earner, the husband, and the financial decision-
maker in the household as the reference person. The results obtained from these alternative defini-
tions do not differ qualitatively from those presented in the paper.
8As approximately 99 percent of households report positive levels of net worth, our findings are
robust to the inclusion of households with non-positive net worth in the analysis.
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lectibles), minus the total value of unsecured debt (including car loans). Business
equity captures the net value of all business assets owned by the couple, while real
estate wealth includes equity in the primary residence, holiday homes, and other prop-
erties. Vehicle wealth equals the total value of all transport (e.g. cars, trucks, etc.)
and recreational (e.g. boats, caravans, etc.) vehicles, while pension wealth captures
the current value of the couple’s pension entitlements. Finally, we define total net
worth as the sum of financial wealth, business equity, real estate equity, vehicles, and
pensions.9
These measures provide high-quality information over time on wealth levels and
asset portfolios. Response rates to the HILDA wealth modules are high and statisti-
cal imputation is undertaken for those households that can not provide information
on some wealth components (see Headey et al., 2005; Marks et al., 2005).10 Blox-
ham & Bett (2009) compare wealth measures constructed from HILDA data to those
generated by the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian Bureau of Statistics
using data from financial institutions, national income accounts, and cross-sectional
surveys. They conclude that HILDA data are reliable and result in wealth measures
that are broadly similar to those derived from other sources with any disparities due
to differences in scope rather than data quality.11
3.2 Locus of Control Measure
In 2003, 2004, and 2007, HILDA respondents were asked the seven original items of
the Psychological Coping Resources component of the Mastery Module developed by
Pearlin & Schooler (1978). Figure 1 shows the wording of each item and the distribu-
tion of responses. Mastery captures beliefs about the extent to which life’s outcomes
are under one’s own control. Although the definition of mastery differs somewhat
from Rotter’s (1966) original definition of locus of control, the two concepts – and the
9All wealth, asset, and income measures are in 2010 Australian dollars.
10We follow standard practice in including these imputed cases in our analysis in order to avoid
bias against larger households which are more likely to experience item non-response (see Headey
et al., 2005).
11For additional information on the quality of the HILDA wealth data see Headey et al. (2008)
and Wilkins (2013).
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scales used to measure them – are very similar. For clarity, we use the term “locus of
control” when describing our results.12 Locus of control is conceptually related to the
broader concept of self-control and locus of control items are included in Rosenbaum’s
(1980) Self-Control Schedule which is used to measure self-control.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
We use factor analysis to construct an overall index measuring locus of control (see
Piatek & Pinger, 2010; Cobb-Clark et al., 2014). Specifically, we use factor loadings
obtained from individual predictions as weights and construct a weighted index which
is based on all seven items and is increasing in internal control tendencies. To facilitate
interpretation, we standardize the index to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of 1. Our results are robust to an alternative index that weights each item equally.
Using HILDA data, Cobb-Clark & Schurer (2013) demonstrate that locus of con-
trol is relatively stable over time and does not appear to be influenced by a series
of life events. Any variation in individuals’ responses to the items measuring locus
of control appears to be the result of random noise. Consequently, we minimize any
measurement error in our locus of control measure by averaging our index across the
years in which the underlying items are observed. Finally, we construct an indicator
variable for having an internal locus of control which equals 1 if the reference person
is in the top 50 percent of the locus of control distribution and 0 otherwise.13
3.3 Controls
Our analysis controls for a number of other factors that have been found to be im-
portant wealth determinants. Life-cycle theory suggests that it is the permanent
component of current income upon which savings and consumption decisions – and
12In fact, psychologists argue that it is possible to distinguish (and measure) a number of closely
related concepts (in particular, mastery, self-efficacy, and locus of control) which together comprise
a broader notion of what is referred to as “perceived behavioral control” (see Ajzen, 2002).
13Our results are robust to the choice of alternative cutoff points including the 25th or the 75th
percentile. The correlation in partners’ locus of control is 0.7 which is statistically significant at the 1
percent level.
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ultimately wealth accumulation – are based (Friedman, 1957). Consequently, we
control for permanent income using the natural logarithm of real net financial year
disposable household income averaged over 2001 to 2010.
We also account for a range of demographic characteristics that are likely to influ-
ence wealth accumulation through their effects on expenditure patterns or preferences
for precautionary savings. Because wealth accumulation occurs at the household level,
we include separate control variables for both the reference person and the spouse.
Specifically, we control for the reference person’s gender and the age of both partners.
Educational attainment of each partner is accounted for by a set of indicator variables
denoting the highest level of education obtained (i.e. postgraduate degree, graduate
diploma/certificate, bachelor’s degree, diploma, any certificate, grade 12 completion,
and less than grade 12). To account for the relationship between family structure
and household wealth, we further control for the number of dependent children in the
household under the age of 25 as well as for whether or not the reference person has
ever been divorced.
Finally, previous research has found that personality traits are related to vari-
ous dimensions of wealth, including individuals’ marginal utility of income (Boyce
& Wood, 2011), their level of retirement saving (Duckworth & Weir, 2011), and the
amount of unsecured debt and financial assets they hold (Brown & Taylor, 2011).
Consequently, we distinguish the effect of locus of control on wealth patterns from
the effect of other non-cognitive skills by controlling directly for personality traits as
measured by the Big Five (Goldberg, 1992).14 Appendix Table A1 presents the means
and standard deviations of the control variables in 2006 and 2010 by the reference
person’s locus of control.
14In 2005 and 2009, HILDA employed a 36-item inventory based on Goldberg (1992) and Saucier
(1994) to measure personality traits. Principal component analysis was used to derive the contribu-
tion of each item to the five personality traits. Since personality traits are generally stable over time
(Cobb-Clark & Schurer, 2013), we average over the available data to reduce measurement error and
standardize the result to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
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3.4 Descriptive Evidence: Net Worth and Locus of Control
Table 1 contains information on the distribution of total net worth and the value
of individual assets by year and locus of control of the household’s reference per-
son. Households in which the reference person has an internal locus of control have
higher levels of net worth – both in total and across all asset types – in each of the
three years in which wealth is measured. Over time, the median wealth gap between
households with an internal versus external reference person increases from approx-
imately $85,000 in 2002 to over $120,000 in 2006 and then falls slightly to $103,000
in 2010. Although very few (approximately 1 percent) of households report that they
have zero or negative net worth, those that do are more likely to have a reference per-
son with an external locus of control. Together, these differences result in a disparity
in the cumulative household wealth distributions of reference persons with an internal
versus external locus of control (see Figure 2).
[Insert Table 1 here]
[Insert Figure 2 here]
In order to assess the magnitude of the wealth gap associated with locus of control
across the entire wealth distribution, we estimate simultaneous conditional quantile
regressions of net worth, (Wit), on our indicator of whether or not the reference person
has an internal locus of control. Specifically, we estimate
Wit = α
τ
0 + α
τ
1Ii + ε
τ
it, (1)
where τ reflects the respective τ -decile of the wealth distribution and I is the indicator
variable capturing the locus of control of the household’s reference person. Households
are indexed by i and t indexes time (t = 2002, 2006, 2010). Equation (1) is estimated
simultaneously at all deciles of the wealth distribution and the estimated coefficients
and standard errors are presented in the first two columns of each panel of Table 2. As
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we condition only on the reference person’s locus of control, the estimates obtained
from these conditional quantile regressions capture the raw wealth gaps associated
with locus of control at different points of the wealth distribution. The equality of
the locus-of-control wealth gap across the wealth distribution is strongly rejected.15
The results in Table 2 indicate that – across the entire distribution – households in
which the reference person has an internal locus of control hold significantly higher lev-
els of wealth than households in which the reference person is external. The magnitude
of the gap relative to levels of net worth (see column 3) is U-shaped, with relative gaps
larger at the bottom and top of the wealth distribution (see columns 4, 8, and 12).
Thus, although the absolute size of the wealth gap – approximately $500,000 – is
largest among households in the top decile of the wealth distribution, the relative
disparity in wealth associated with locus of control is particularly important among
poor households. Among the poorest 10 percent of households, those with an internal
reference person are about 40 (2002) to 60 (2010) percent wealthier than those with
an external reference person.
4 Wealth Accumulation
4.1 Estimation Strategy
We begin by analyzing the relationship between locus of control and households’
wealth accumulation. With few exceptions, researchers interested in the determi-
nants of wealth typically estimate marginal effects only at the mean of the wealth
distribution. We go beyond this, however, to also consider the potential for locus
of control to have differential effects on the savings behavior of poor versus wealthy
households. We are aware of only one other study that takes a distributional per-
spective when addressing a similar issue. Banks et al. (2010) estimate the effect of IQ
on wealth at different points of the wealth distribution using the classic conditional
15Simultaneous estimation across different values of τ allows the variance-covariance matrix of the
different ατ1 to be obtained and the significance of the wealth gap associated with locus of control at
points of the distribution to be tested (see Zhang, 2002). The equality of αˆτ1 at all values of τ was
tested and rejected using an F test.
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quantile regression estimator developed by Koenker & Bassett (1978). The difficulty,
however, is that their estimated marginal effects can only be interpreted with respect
to the distribution of wealth (Y ) conditional on wealth determinants X – i.e. only
among individuals with the same IQ, age, education, etc. (Fournier & Koske, 2013;
Alejo et al., 2011). This conditional distribution effectively corresponds to the error
distribution, i.e. F (Y |X) = F (ε), not the wealth distribution F (Y ) itself (Ker, 2011;
Froehlich & Melly, 2010).16 Therefore, as is often the case, their conditional quantile
results are difficult to interpret and may be irrelevant from a policy perspective (see
Ker, 2011; Borah & Basu, 2013).
We therefore turn to unconditional quantile regression in order to estimate marginal
effects at various quantiles of the overall wealth distribution. We use the method
recently developed by Firpo et al. (2009), which relies on a “recentered influence
function” to essentially reweight the dependent variable so that the mean of the
reweighted variable corresponds to the quantile of interest. This then allows OLS
to be applied directly to the reweighted dependent variable.17 In addition to allowing
us to estimate marginal effects at various points of the overall wealth distribution,
unconditional quantile regression retains the advantages of quantile regression more
generally. Specifically, unlike standard OLS estimation, quantile regression is not sen-
sitive to outliers and non-normality (Baum, 2013) – both of which are highly likely
in the wealth context. Distribution quantiles are also invariant to monotonic trans-
formations of the dependent variable, e.g. log transformations (Koenker, 2005), while
data censoring is unproblematic in quantile regression (Powell, 1986).
The unconditional quantile approach developed by Firpo et al. (2009) relies on an
16This distinction implies, for example, that someone who is in the 50th percentile of the wealth
distribution conditional on their IQ and other characteristics might be in the 75th percentile of
the overall wealth distribution (Borah & Basu, 2013). Moreover, an individual’s conditional wealth
quantile may change as covariates change (Froehlich & Melly, 2010).
17Firpo et al. (2007) show that OLS may be viewed as a special case of the unconditional quan-
tile regression model. The authors also develop a second estimator that assumes a logistic model
and a third estimator that does not make any functional form assumptions. They show that re-
sults based on the different estimators are very similar to each other. All estimation is done
using the RIF-Regression STATA ado file from Firpo et al. (2009) which can be downloaded at
http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html.
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influence function (IF) at each quantile τ of the distribution of Y , which is defined as:
IF(Y ; qτ ) = (τ − 1{Y ≤ qτ})/fY (qτ ), (2)
where qτ is the value of the cumulative distribution of Y at the τth quantile and fY (·) is
the marginal density function of Y . The recentered influence function simply recenters
the influence function so that its mean corresponds the distribution value at the
percentile of interest. Specifically,
RIF (Y ; qτ ) = qτ + IF(Y ; qτ ). (3)
Unconditional quantile regression involves estimating the expectation of the recentered
influence function conditional on a set of covariates X, i.e. E[RIF(Y ; qτ )|X]). For
simplicity, a linear relationship between the two is typically assumed so that
E[RIF(Y ; qτ )|X] = X ′βτ . (4)
We use this approach to estimate two models. The first captures the effects of
locus of control on wealth levels accounting for previous net worth four years earlier.
This allows us to assess the role of locus of control in households’ wealth accumulation
over a four year period. The second links locus of control to the savings rate (relative
to household income) over the same period. Banks et al. (2010) adopt a similar
approach in estimating the effect of cognitive function and numeracy on retirement
wealth trajectories. Specifically, we assume that the growth in a household’s net worth
is given by:
E[RIF(Wit; qτ )|Xit] = βτ0 + βτ1Wit−4 + βτ2Wit−4 × Ii + βτ3 Ii (5)
+ βτ4Tt=2010 + Z
′
itβ
τ
5 + ε
τ
it,
where Wit is the level of net worth of household i (i = 1, ..., N) at time t (t =
2006, 2010), Ii is an indicator of whether or not the reference person has an internal
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locus of control, Tt is a dummy variable for the year 2010, and Zit is the set of control
variables including characteristics for both reference persons and their partners as
described above. The inclusion of Tt=2010 allows household wealth levels to differ in
the periods before and after the Great Recession. We are particularly interested in βτ3
which measures the disparity in wealth levels for households in which the reference
person is internal as opposed to external and in βτ2 which captures disparities in the
rate of wealth accumulation for these households.18
We also estimate the determinants of the household savings rate. Specifically,
E[RIF((Wit −Wit−4)/Yi; qτ )|Xit] = γτ0 + γτ1 Ii + γτ2Tt=2010 + Z ′itγτ3 + ετit, (6)
where the saving rate (Wit −Wit−4)/Yi is the difference in total net worth Wit over a
four year period in relation to the total permanent income received over those same
four years (Yi).19 The coefficient of interest is γτ1 which captures the difference in the
savings rate between internals and externals.
4.2 Results
We estimate two specifications for each of the wealth models given by equations (5)
and (6). The first controls only for the reference person’s locus of control, an indicator
for 2010, and, in the model of wealth levels, for lagged wealth as well as its interaction
with locus of control. The second adds a full set of control variables including the
household’s permanent income and the characteristics of both partners. Comparing
results across specifications sheds light on the extent to which the raw wealth gap
associated with locus of control (see Tables 1 and 2) is the result of disparity in other
related factors, for example income or personality traits. We report OLS coefficients,
unconditional quantile regression coefficients, and robust standard errors in Table 3
for wealth levels and in Table 4 for savings rates.20 Unconditional quantile regression
18As quantile regression is not sensitive to outliers, we estimate the model in levels not logs.
19Recall that permanent income equals average real net financial year disposable household income
over all the years the reference person is observed between 2001 and 2010.
20Complete results are presented in Appendix Tables 2 and 3.
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coefficients can be interpreted as the marginal effects associated with each quantile τ
of the unconditional wealth (or savings rate) distribution (Firpo et al., 2009), while
OLS coefficients capture the marginal effect at the mean. Finally, we report the total
marginal effect of a change in locus of control on wealth levels accounting for both its
main effect (βτ3 ) as well as its interaction with lagged wealth (βτ2 ).21
Households’ wealth levels are strongly positively related across years. Among
households with an external reference person, each dollar of wealth held four years
ago is associated with $0.91 in current wealth on average (see Column 1, Panel A). The
skewness of household wealth results in an inter-temporal relationship in net worth
that is much weaker when evaluated at our particular distribution quantiles than when
evaluated at the mean however. Poor households have $0.23 in current net worth for
every dollar of net worth they held four years previously, while wealthy households
hold $0.78 for every dollar of previous wealth. Interestingly, the inter-temporal re-
lationship in wealth is significantly weaker – though still positive – for households
with an internal reference person. Poor households with an internal reference per-
son, for example, have a relationship between current and prior wealth levels that is
approximately half that of households with an external reference person (i.e. $0.23
vs. $0.11), while the inter-temporal relationship in wealth is −$0.25 (approximately
one third) smaller among wealthy households. Banks et al. (2010) also find evidence
of a significantly positive inter-temporal relationship in wealth levels for individuals
aged 50-61, but find that the relationship is significantly negative for individuals aged
65 and older.22
[Insert Table 3 here]
Households with an internal reference person accumulate significantly more wealth
21Specifically, given a model with an interaction term of the form Y = b0+b1X1+b2X2+b3X1X2+e,
the respective average marginal effects of X1 and X2 may be written as b̂1 + b̂3X2 and b̂1 + b̂3X1,
where hats denote estimated parameters and over-bars indicate sample averages. The standard errors
may be obtained from a reparameterized model of the form y = a0+c1X1+c2X2+b3(X1−µX1)(X2−
µX2) + e, where ĉ1 = b̂1 + b̂3X2 and ĉ2 = b̂1 + b̂3X1.
22Differences in estimation strategy make it impossible to directly compare the magnitude of our
results to Banks et al. (2010).
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over time – i.e. save more – than do households that were equally wealthy four years
earlier, but have an external reference person. The locus-of-control wealth gap ranges
from $154,624 at the mean to between $167,012 (25th percentile) to $278,234 (75th
percentile) across the distribution. Table 3 also reports total marginal effects which
combine these savings gaps with differences in the inter-temporal relationship in
wealth (see above) to provide an estimate of the overall impact of locus of control
for households. The results demonstrate that poor households (25th percentile) accu-
mulate $65,356 more wealth over a four year period if the reference person is internal,
while rich households (75th percentile) accumulate $70,837 more. The size of these
locus-of-control wealth gaps is remarkably similar irrespective of how wealthy house-
holds are, though they are somewhat smaller than that estimated by OLS at the
mean of the distribution ($83,389) which is consistent with the skewness in household
wealth levels.
The magnitude of the locus-of-control gap in wealth accumulation is somewhat
smaller once we control for households’ permanent income and the demographic char-
acteristics, educational attainment, and personality traits of both partners. Perma-
nent income, in particular, is an important determinant of wealth levels with each
dollar of permanent income being associated with between $2.55 (poor households)
and $5.97 (wealthy households) in current net worth. Nonetheless, the disparity in
current wealth levels associated with reference persons’ locus of control remains sub-
stantial (almost $49,000) and statistically significant among poor (25th percentile)
and median households, becoming somewhat smaller (almost $40,000) and statisti-
cally insignificant at the 75th percentile and the mean. As we are accounting for
previous wealth levels – and a range of other characteristics – this indicates that
wealth accumulation is associated with locus of control particularly for households in
the bottom half of the wealth distribution. Bernheim et al. (2013) argue that poverty
undermines the ability to exercise self-control, while wealth sustains it. Our results
suggest that whatever self-control poor households possess is particularly important
in understanding their economic well-being.
Finally, it is important to note that wealth accumulation was significantly lower
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between 2006 and 2010 than it was between 2002 and 2006. Everything else equal,
households saved on average $189,938 less in the period encompassing the Great Re-
cession than they did in the previous four year period. These changes are consistent
with evidence that there was a large decline in equity prices which by March 2009 had
reduced the wealth of Australian households by almost 10 percent. Approximately
half of this decline was reversed by the end of November 2009 (Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 2010).
We turn now to consider the relationship between the reference person’s locus of
control and the household’s savings rate as a fraction of its permanent income (see Ta-
ble 4). We find that – on average across the entire distribution – households in which
the reference person has an internal locus of control save a greater proportion of their
permanent income. These differences are small and insignificant among households
that do not save a lot (25th percentile), but become substantial among households
in the top half of the savings rate distribution. At the median, households with an
internal reference person save 7.7 percentage points more of their permanent income,
while at the 75th percentile this gap is 11.9 percentage points. The locus-of-control
gap in savings rates becomes smaller at the 25th percentile and median of the savings
distribution, but larger at the 75th percentile, once we account for the demographic
characteristics, educational attainment, and personality traits of both partners. Fi-
nally, we find that on average households that have an internal reference person save
a larger proportion of their permanent income than do their external counterparts.
These OLS results are imprecisely estimated, however, which is consistent with the
added efficiency of quantile regression if the errors are non-normal (Baum, 2013).
Overall, these results are consistent with Chatterjee et al. (2011) who similarly find
a positive relationship between self-efficacy and savings rates measured relative to
initial wealth.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Not surprisingly, households’ savings rate was substantially lower in 2006-2010
than it was immediately prior to the Great Recession (2002-2006). Wealth accumu-
17
lation as a fraction of permanent income earned over the same period was 27.3 per-
centage points lower in poor households and 36.8 percentage points lower in wealthy
households. This is in line with U.S. trends, for example, where the ratio of house-
hold wealth to disposable personal income reached its peak in 2006 before reaching
its lowest level in 2009 (Cooper & Dynan, 2013).
Taken together, these results indicate that the locus of control of a household’s
reference person is clearly related to the household’s savings behavior in ways that are
consistent with behavioral models which argue that self-control assists in achieving
long-term economic goals. These relationships persist even after we account for a
range of other factors – most notably permanent income, education, and personality
traits– that are themselves influenced by locus of control.
5 Asset Portfolios
5.1 Estimation Strategy
Behavioral savings models imply that tension between temptation and self-control
drives not only the amount of wealth that households accumulate, but also the way
that they hold it. In particular, households find it easier to maintain self-control if
they allocate wealth to assets with lower degrees of temptation and regard the various
components of their wealth as non-fungible (e.g. Levin, 1998; Thaler, 1990). We
investigate this proposition by analyzing whether households with an internal reference
person – and presumably more self-control – allocate their wealth differently across
asset types than do households in which the reference person is external. Unlike the
previous literature, which typically considers specific assets in isolation (e.g. Bogan &
Fertig, 2013; Grinblatt et al., 2011; Chatterjee et al., 2011), we simultaneously analyze
five mutually exclusive and exhaustive components of net wealth: (1) financial wealth,
(2) business equity, (3) real estate equity, (4) vehicles, and (5) pensions.
Our simultaneous asset model requires estimation of marginal effects at the mean
of the distribution, leaving the results sensitive to outliers and non-normality. The
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standard approach in this situation would be to take a log transformation of the
dependent variable. However, while less than two percent of households have nega-
tive net worth overall, it is not uncommon for households to hold zero (or negative)
amounts of individual assets. Thus, we need an estimation strategy that can account
for non-positive asset holdings. We therefore adopt an inverse hyperbolic sine trans-
formation – denoted as sinh−1 –, which is also defined for zero or negative values
(Cobb-Clark & Hildebrand, 2006, 2009). This function is similar to a log transforma-
tion as it is essentially the log transformation for positive values and a negative log
transformation for negative values (Burbidge et al., 1988).
We estimate the following reduced-form model of asset composition:
E[sinh−1(Aikt)|Xit] = δk0 + δk1Wit + δk2Wit × Ii + δk3Ii + Z ′itδk4 + εkit. (7)
where Aikt is the value of asset k that household i holds in time period t. Households
may face credit constraints which both depend on their wealth levels and drive port-
folio choices. Like Blau & Graham (1990), we model asset levels as a function of net
worth (Wit) in order to account for any capital market imperfections in asset alloca-
tions. In particular, δ1 reflects the effect of total wealth, while δ3 captures the effect
of having an internal locus of control (Ii) on asset levels. Any differential effect of
wealth on the portfolio choices of households with an internal as opposed to external
reference person is captured by δ2. As before, we also control for a vector (Zit) of
demographic characteristics, human capital, and personality traits of both partners as
well as household permanent income in order to account for differences in portfolios
choices related to household circumstances including life-cycle stage.
We estimate equation (7) as a system of five equations, one for each asset type.
Since the sum of assets across asset types is equal to total net worth and since we
are controlling for net worth in each asset equation, we require a set of cross-equation
restrictions in order to ensure that the marginal effects are interpretable (see Blau
and Graham 1990). First, we constrain the marginal effects of an additional dollar of
net worth (mk1) to be jointly equal to one over all asset types k, i.e.
∑
k
∂E[Aikt|Xit]
∂Wit
=
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∑
k
mk1 = 1.
Second, the marginal effects of all other independent variables must capture the
effect of a one unit change in that variable on a particular asset – holding net worth
constant. This implies that if, for example, higher education levels result in the house-
hold holding more financial wealth, this must be counterbalanced by a corresponding
decrease in the holding of some other asset type. Thus, the sum of the marginal
effects of all independent variables other than net worth across asset types must be
constrained to sum to zero.23
5.2 Results
The results (marginal effects and t-statistics) from simultaneous estimation of our five
asset equations are given in Table 5. Panel A presents estimation results from a model
in which only total net worth, locus of control, and their interaction are controlled.
The results in Panel B stem from a model which includes the entire set of control
variables.24
The marginal effect of net worth captures the way that an additional dollar of
net wealth is allocated across different asset types. Each additional dollar of wealth
is associated with an increase of (i) $0.54 in real estate equity; (ii) $0.22 in financial
wealth; (iii) $0.15 in pension wealth; (iv) $0.08 in business equity; and (v) $0.01 in
vehicles (see Panel A). Controlling for households’ permanent income as well as the
demographic characteristics, human capital, and personality traits of both partners
leaves asset portfolios relatively unchanged (see Panel B). The exception is that the
share of additional wealth allocated to business equity rises by $0.03, while the share
23The marginal effects of a regression model of the form Y = sinh−1(A) = X ′δ + ε are given by
dA
dX
=
dA
dY
dY
dX
=
dA
dY
δˆ =
1
2
[eθY + e−θY ]δˆ,
where
A = sinh(Y ) =
1
2θ
(eθY − e−θY ) and dA
dY
=
1
2
[eθY + e−θY ].
We calculate average marginal effects using the household weights and bootstrap the standard errors.
24Complete results are presented in Appendix Table 4.
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allocated to pension wealth falls by a corresponding amount.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Households in which the reference person is internal hold significantly less finan-
cial wealth ($272,017), but significantly more vehicle wealth ($12,000) and pension
wealth ($226,557) than equally wealthy households in which the reference person has
an external locus of control (see Panel A). There are also significant differences in the
way that households reallocate their portfolios as they become wealthier. For each
dollar increase in net worth, for example, households with an internal reference per-
son allocate $0.09 more to building financial wealth than do households with external
reference persons. This is counterbalanced by gaps of $0.03 and $0.07 in the shares
of additional net worth being allocated to real estate and pension wealth, respec-
tively. Not surprisingly, these differentials in households’ asset portfolios are reduced
somewhat when we add control variables (see Panel B). Nonetheless, the reference
person’s locus of control remains a significant predictor of the portfolio choices that
the household makes. Overall, the combined effect implies that households with an
internal reference person and average levels of net worth hold considerably less fi-
nancial wealth ($74,438), but more pension wealth ($42,488) than otherwise similar
households with an external reference person.
It is interesting to put these results in the context of previous research, which finds
that individuals’ cognitive skills (e.g. Christelis et al., 2010; Grinblatt et al., 2011), risk
preferences (see Cesarini et al., 2010, and the references therein), mental health (Bogan
& Fertig, 2013), and personality traits (Brown & Taylor, 2011) are all related to the
amount of financial assets they hold. Our results are consistent with this evidence
that a broad range of skills, preferences, and traits contribute to understanding the
heterogeneity in portfolio choices. Like Chatterjee et al. (2011), we also find that
perceptions of control are related to financial wealth holdings. At the same time,
Chatterjee et al. (2011) use a simple model of financial market participation to show
that individuals’ self-efficacy is linked to a higher propensity to own financial assets.
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The authors, however, do not control for household wealth raising the possibility
that individuals with greater self-efficacy are more like to own financial assets simply
because they are wealthier. In contrast, when comparing the entire portfolio allocation
of equally wealthy households, we find that an internal locus of control is associated
with lower levels of financial wealth throughout much of the wealth distribution.
In fact, the locus-of-control gap in financial wealth is only positive for very wealth
households with a net worth greater than $1.8 million. Instead, households with an
internal reference person allocate more of their wealth to building pension assets.
Thus, self-control may lead households to build wealth by relying more heavily on
the various commitment devices, e.g. eligibility ages or withdrawal penalties, that
dramatically raise the costs of using wealth in the form of pension assets to finance
current consumption.
6 Conclusions
Behavioral savings models emphasize the tension between temptation and self-control
in shaping households’ consumption, expenditure, and ultimately, savings decisions.
To the extent that their predictions characterize behavior, they have the potential
to not only enhance our understanding of economic decision making, but also to
expanded the spectrum of policy options that could be used to assist households in
meeting their long-term objectives. This paper makes a valuable contribution to this
debate by empirically analyzing the link between individuals’ locus of control – one
component of self-control more generally – and their savings behavior. Consistent with
the predictions of behavioral savings theory, we find that an internal locus of control
is related to higher savings both in levels and as a fraction of permanent income.
For wealthy households, this manifests itself as a gap in the rate of savings relative
to permanent income. For poor households, there is a large disparity in the amount
of wealth accumulated over time. Locus of control is also related to the way that
equally wealthy households allocate their wealth across asset types with households
that have an internal reference person holding significantly less financial wealth, but
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significantly more pension wealth.
Unfortunately, differences in sample selection and estimation strategies make it
nearly impossible to directly compare the magnitude of results derived from different
studies of savings behavior, even when concepts are defined and measured similarly.
Our results, however, lead us to conclude that perceptions of control may be as im-
portant as human capital and cognitive skills in explaining heterogeneity in wealth
accumulation and portfolio allocations. Banks et al. (2010), for example, are unable to
find substantive effects of numeracy on replacement rates or well-being in retirement,
while Cooper & Zhu (2013) argue that education affects financial decisions mainly
through mean income. In contrast, we find substantial effects of locus of control on
savings behavior despite controlling for educational attainment and permanent in-
come. Interestingly, Perry & Morris (2005) show that individuals with an internal
locus of control believe they have more capacity to manage their finances by control-
ling spending, paying their bills on time, planning for the future, and saving. Our
results indicate that these beliefs may also translate into savings behavior that leads
to very real gains in economic well-being.
As Mastrobuoni & Weinberg (2009, pg.165) note, however, “not all individuals
struggle with self-control equally in real-world markets”. Economic conditions and
self-control problems may interact in ways that generate poverty traps, for exam-
ple. Poverty can potentially undermine self-control if willpower is more costly when
consumption is low (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988), if imperfect credit markets limit the use-
fulness of self-control (Bernheim et al., 2013), or if the marginal propensity to spend
on temptation goods falls as consumption rises (Banerjee & Mullainathan, 2010). Un-
fortunately, our analysis does not permit us to examine whether the rich exercise more
self-control than the poor. We do find, however, that the relative wealth payoff asso-
ciated with having an internal locus of control is much greater at the 25th percentile
of the wealth distribution than it is at the 75th percentile. For the poor, economic
well-being and self-control may be very closely linked.
The welfare implications of policies to promote household savings fundamentally
depend on whether we have accounted for the role of temptation and self-control (see
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O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). Policies that are optimal in the absence of self-control
problems, e.g. the removal of credit constraints, can have unintended consequences
when temptation is taken into account (see Banerjee & Mullainathan, 2010). More-
over, many experts are using the insights gained from behavioral savings models to
design new programs that assist households in meeting their savings goals through
commitment devices and strategically-chosen default options (e.g. Thaler & Benartzi,
2004; Kooreman & Prast, 2010). Our results show that households in which the refer-
ence person has an external locus of control save less and allocate less wealth to their
pensions making them a sensible group to target for intervention.
Taken together, our results shed light on the relationship between locus of control,
wealth accumulation, savings rates, and portfolio choices. Despite this, they leave a
number of questions unanswered. In particular, why does locus of control matter?
What is the mechanism linking households’ locus of control to their savings behavior?
In keeping with the psychological evidence, we have focused on the role of locus of
control as one important component of self-control. Yet with observational data we
cannot rule out other plausible, potentially-related hypotheses. Future research which
explored these mechanisms using a variety of research strategies and data sources
would be extremely valuable.
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Figure 1: Distribution of subcomponents of locus of control
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Table 1: Net Worth and Assets by Year and Locus of Control
Internals Externals
Mean SD N Mean SD N
2002
Net Worth
Net Worth 778,110.92 1,043,397.05 955 586,590.54 720,391.73 998
Median Net Worth 483,413.92 877,279.58 955 398,734.18 681,680.63 998
Net Worth if > 0 785,987.45 1,045,506.53 946 598,431.50 721,747.74 982
% > 0 0.990 0.098 955 0.982 0.134 998
Components of Net Worth
Net Financial Wealth 110,843.20 311,202.46 955 85,487.49 262,519.58 998
Business Equity 82,038.94 444,477.84 955 42,663.63 263,055.88 998
Housing Equity 355,291.55 510,727.24 955 295,267.08 340,370.70 998
Vehicles Equity 34,894.37 64,873.37 955 28,781.98 36,956.92 998
Pensions 195,042.86 285,895.75 955 134,390.37 210,703.95 998
2006
Net Worth
Net Worth 1,141,576.42 1,778,903.69 952 826,940.61 1,113,792.86 992
Median Net Worth 670,000.00 791,046.70 952 549,438.20 564,046.98 992
Net Worth if > 0 1,152,087.12 1,782,773.79 944 844,535.10 1,116,606.94 976
% > 0 0.992 0.092 952 0.982 0.135 992
Components of Net Worth
Net Financial Wealth 140,533.57 515,863.67 952 124,165.47 486,680.42 992
Business Equity 109,929.91 535,407.54 952 58,864.10 384,572.99 992
Housing Equity 602,491.12 1,145,514.43 952 439,037.32 506,516.82 992
Vehicles Equity 37,134.99 49,539.09 952 32,607.87 44,164.19 992
Pensions 251,486.82 376,922.92 952 172,265.85 284,502.38 992
2010
Net Worth
Net Worth 1,065,611.11 1,276,958.18 1012 868,776.07 1,089,909.80 931
Median Net Worth 687,185.00 879,021.58 1012 584,400.00 766,318.34 931
Net Worth if > 0 1,080,537.08 1,276,767.00 999 880,870.80 1,089,249.46 917
% > 0 0.988 0.107 1012 0.989 0.105 931
Components of Net Worth
Net Financial Wealth 124,859.71 412,609.36 1012 90,163.43 289,684.23 931
Business Equity 83,530.35 429,234.33 1012 51,001.13 311,821.41 931
Housing Equity 572,191.97 683,660.11 1012 490,470.72 620,788.09 931
Vehicles Equity 37,915.35 43,921.77 1012 31,890.70 45,691.63 931
Pensions 247,113.73 342,279.88 1012 205,250.09 346,416.65 931
Note: Weighted numbers based on weights provided by HILDA.
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Figure 2: Net Worth Distribution by Locus of Control
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Table 3: Determinants of Net Worth, Unconditional Quantile Regression
(Coefficients and Standard Errors)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75
Panel A
Lag household net worth 0.91*** 0.23*** 0.35*** 0.78***
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
Lag household net worth × -0.09 -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.25***
internal locus of control (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09)
Internal locus of control 154623.83* 167011.17*** 191049.21*** 278234.21***
(84432.54) (30805.01) (37236.29) (71317.48)
Year: 2010 -219362.73*** -26886.79 -34224.51 -94869.81**
(31046.84) (19413.06) (21333.52) (38245.83)
Constant 343221.29*** 146321.25*** 345702.09*** 548228.94***
(34772.99) (23331.50) (25668.13) (42001.59)
Average marginal effects:
Lag household net worth 0.87*** 0.16*** 0.27*** 0.65***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05)
Internal locus of control 83388.90*** 65356.02*** 62257.52*** 70837.24*
(30453.29) (19212.22) (22313.94) (40891.51)
Control variables No No No No
Observations 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795
Panel B
Internal locus of control 0.71*** 0.11*** 0.21*** 0.56***
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Lag household net worth -0.08 -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.22***
(0.11) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
Lag household net worth × 108009.57 128193.54*** 154793.09*** 221175.06***
internal locus of control (81748.50) (27895.94) (32947.89) (66368.35)
Year: 2010 -189937.72*** -22213.43 -23741.63 -77795.85**
(27577.09) (17958.73) (19805.68) (36612.95)
Permanent income 8.94*** 2.55*** 3.60*** 5.97***
(1.35) (0.30) (0.41) (0.75)
Constant 2917.64 1786.98 1010.26 -1346.16
(3110.84) (2331.27) (2419.88) (4341.03)
Average marginal effects:
Internal locus of control 0.67*** 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.45***
(0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Lag household net worth 39623.84 48934.20** 48815.68** 39908.66
(30478.98) (19220.47) (21943.33) (43081.08)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Determinants of Savings Rate, Unconditional Quantile Regression
(Coefficients and Standard Errors)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75
Panel A
Internal locus of control 0.107 0.019 0.077** 0.119**
(0.077) (0.032) (0.033) (0.048)
Year: 2010 -0.622*** -0.273*** -0.294*** -0.368***
(0.078) (0.032) (0.033) (0.048)
Constant 0.802*** 0.081*** 0.475*** 1.068***
(0.067) (0.025) (0.028) (0.042)
Control variables No No No No
Observations 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795
Panel B
Internal locus of control 0.109 -0.013 0.051 0.131**
(0.088) (0.034) (0.036) (0.054)
Year: 2010 -0.004 -0.007** -0.001 0.006
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Constant 0.010 0.032 -0.006 0.011
(0.089) (0.040) (0.043) (0.063)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
2006 2010
Internal External Internal External
Income
Disposable household income 92,603 78,320 101,755 89,129
(61,980) (44,193) (63,835) (58,414)
Permanent income 90,638 77,372 91,061 79,824
(50,854) (38,691) (46,354) (38,186)
Demographic characteristics
Age 47.9 49.6 48.3 50.3
(12.2) (12.1) (12.1) (12.3)
Female 0.456 0.476 0.484 0.468
(0.498) (0.500) (0.500) (0.499)
Number of children 1.269 1.225 1.287 1.094
(1.547) (1.590) (1.583) (1.505)
Ever divorced 0.138 0.136 0.131 0.148
(0.345) (0.343) (0.338) (0.355)
Education
Postgrad degree 0.052 0.046 0.062 0.050
(0.223) (0.209) (0.241) (0.218)
Graduate diploma/certificate 0.086 0.068 0.095 0.067
(0.281) (0.252) (0.294) (0.251)
Bachelor 0.167 0.139 0.179 0.149
(0.373) (0.346) (0.383) (0.356)
Diploma 0.108 0.093 0.116 0.107
(0.311) (0.290) (0.320) (0.309)
Any certificate 0.236 0.250 0.231 0.263
(0.425) (0.433) (0.422) (0.441)
Year 12 0.112 0.114 0.121 0.117
(0.316) (0.318) (0.326) (0.322)
Personality traits
Extroversion (Std.) 0.291 -0.094 0.292 -0.145
(1.000) (0.911) (1.000) (0.910)
Agreeableness (Std.) 0.185 -0.093 0.182 -0.086
(0.906) (0.933) (0.904) (0.939)
Conscientiousness (Std.) 0.431 0.034 0.404 0.019
(0.919) (0.908) (0.907) (0.903)
Emotional stability (Std.) 0.460 -0.029 0.417 -0.096
(0.826) (0.876) (0.838) (0.912)
Openess (Std.) 0.044 -0.083 0.028 -0.079
(0.951) (0.917) (0.949) (0.906)
Observations 938 965 989 903
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Table A1 (continued): Descriptive Statistics
2006 2010
Internal External Internal External
Demographic characteristics (Partner)
Age 48.1 49.5 48.5 49.9
(12.2) (11.9) (12.3) (12.0)
Ever divorced 0.143 0.121 0.128 0.120
(0.351) (0.327) (0.334) (0.325)
Education (Partner)
Postgrad degree 0.049 0.040 0.060 0.043
(0.215) (0.195) (0.238) (0.203)
Grad. dipl./cert. 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.075
(0.243) (0.245) (0.246) (0.264)
Bachelor 0.167 0.123 0.183 0.134
(0.373) (0.329) (0.387) (0.341)
Diploma 0.113 0.097 0.116 0.104
(0.317) (0.296) (0.320) (0.305)
Any cert. 0.240 0.223 0.234 0.237
(0.428) (0.417) (0.424) (0.425)
Year 12 0.100 0.122 0.114 0.118
(0.300) (0.327) (0.318) (0.322)
Personality traits (Partner)
Extroversion (Std.) 0.026 -0.199 0.009 -0.165
(0.996) (0.999) (0.989) (0.986)
Agreeableness (Std.) 0.062 -0.055 0.009 -0.102
(0.896) (0.937) (0.901) (0.947)
Conscientiousness (Std.) 0.207 -0.079 0.111 -0.133
(0.884) (0.965) (0.880) (0.962)
Emotional stability (Std.) 0.160 -0.323 0.090 -0.370
(0.889) (0.984) (0.924) (0.957)
Openess (Std.) -0.038 -0.028 -0.042 -0.025
(0.899) (0.980) (0.896) (0.955)
Observations 938 965 989 903
Note: Weighted numbers based on weights provided by HILDA. Standard deviations in parenthe-
ses.
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Table A2: Determinants of Net Worth, Unconditional Quantile Regression
(Coefficients and Standard Errors)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75
Lag household net worth 0.71*** 0.11*** 0.21*** 0.56***
(0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Lag household net worth × -0.08 -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.22***
internal locus of control (0.11) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
Internal locus of control 108009.57 128193.54*** 154793.09*** 221175.06***
(81748.50) (27895.94) (32947.89) (66368.35)
Year: 2010 -189937.72*** -22213.43 -23741.63 -77795.85**
(27577.09) (17958.73) (19805.68) (36612.95)
Permanent income 8.94*** 2.55*** 3.60*** 5.97***
(1.35) (0.30) (0.41) (0.75)
Age 2917.64 1786.98 1010.26 -1346.16
(3110.84) (2331.27) (2419.88) (4341.03)
Female -20101.62 -56897.65** -74927.47*** -57934.89
(31191.75) (23772.73) (25977.09) (48020.29)
Number of children 20582.99** -1554.92 3066.94 7888.44
(9725.85) (7351.44) (7666.43) (13180.14)
Ever divorced 7985.51 13704.39 -35663.71 73455.10
(38672.24) (28425.15) (33151.00) (61163.90)
Postgrad degree -23779.85 114247.93** 205998.47*** 373199.33***
(108438.70) (45112.07) (53894.42) (108854.53)
Graduate diploma/certificate -41043.22 152287.37*** 251487.00*** 482804.87***
(92297.02) (35209.45) (44987.45) (93454.22)
Bachelor 37224.61 149120.14*** 161424.60*** 269415.53***
(76052.88) (33194.89) (38045.84) (73227.95)
Diploma 33736.37 151157.99*** 161421.45*** 132006.93*
(71160.17) (32547.23) (39240.31) (74392.57)
Any certificate -356.52 102661.28*** 63322.76** 67302.15
(48857.34) (26543.35) (29368.29) (52067.31)
Year 12 -4768.15 64003.24* 93803.99** 165458.47**
(52682.89) (36572.60) (37924.85) (69609.63)
Extroversion (Std.) -3961.06 -1594.92 -690.32 -34996.32*
(15637.32) (9031.86) (10635.69) (21193.70)
Agreeableness (Std.) -48432.14*** -13567.61 -26838.41** -44494.57**
(17868.54) (11552.77) (12663.65) (22566.76)
Conscientiousness (Std.) 17557.05 45334.76*** 25016.42** 18693.01
(16294.46) (10095.72) (11948.76) (23204.89)
Emotional stability (Std.) -12254.05 -1634.65 11860.48 -5321.94
(16297.13) (12279.65) (12761.24) (23597.27)
Openess (Std.) 33937.45* -22567.09** 21311.40* 71370.51***
(19552.10) (11023.11) (12304.85) (22729.67)
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Table A2 (continued): Determinants of Net Worth, Unconditional Quantile
Regression (Coefficients and Standard Errors)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75
Partner characteristics
Age 33937.45* -22567.09** 21311.40* 71370.51***
(19552.10) (11023.11) (12304.85) (22729.67)
Ever divorced 12237.69*** 11691.90*** 16074.22*** 24240.62***
(3833.81) (2315.37) (2424.67) (4452.45)
Postgrad degree -75759.37* -54366.31* -49681.50 -74298.25
(44905.11) (28457.70) (33713.85) (64729.60)
Grad. dipl./cert. 22992.25 126966.85*** 95295.86* 144502.25
(85332.17) (44068.63) (54085.89) (109682.25)
Bachelor -73254.77 126980.84*** 56650.40 9500.87
(57453.11) (37458.98) (43610.04) (78275.68)
Diploma -100408.52** 164482.24*** 73466.22** 103421.62
(47532.99) (30847.68) (35367.24) (70081.29)
Any cert. -32658.27 86370.68*** 40241.30 30394.64
(56369.90) (32718.98) (38029.70) (72057.49)
Year 12 -90656.56** 93429.87*** 39336.66 -102382.40**
(42386.20) (26821.62) (29006.68) (50888.53)
Extroversion (Std.) -102542.45* 38416.90 -9726.37 -12766.84
(52441.97) (35661.37) (38239.85) (69826.49)
Agreeableness (Std.) -3873.93 2212.08 5371.43 4349.57
(13136.71) (8828.03) (10492.63) (19597.40)
Conscientiousness (Std.) -54533.81*** -6957.80 -26574.84** -89560.75***
(17897.77) (11826.97) (12562.93) (23783.00)
Emotional stability (Std.) 661.68 15364.35 18232.98 1759.09
(17322.35) (9805.77) (11906.22) (22155.98)
Openess (Std.) 31163.19** -12920.66 -24940.95** 50293.53**
(13801.08) (10768.35) (12047.14) (22697.17)
Constant 26800.28 -7538.20 -616.61 21480.11
(16597.76) (10629.37) (12377.09) (22975.64)
Observations 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A3: Determinants of Savings Rate, Unconditional Quantile Regression
(Coefficients and Standard Errors)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75
Internal locus of control 0.109 -0.013 0.051 0.131**
(0.088) (0.034) (0.036) (0.054)
Age -0.004 -0.007** -0.001 0.006
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Female 0.010 0.032 -0.006 0.011
(0.089) (0.040) (0.043) (0.063)
Number of children 0.015 -0.011 0.002 -0.011
(0.028) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018)
Ever divorced 0.012 0.023 0.073 0.068
(0.099) (0.050) (0.052) (0.080)
Postgrad degree 0.083 0.084 0.124 0.108
(0.181) (0.075) (0.083) (0.131)
Graduate diploma/certificate 0.174 0.067 0.175** 0.176
(0.162) (0.071) (0.070) (0.107)
Bachelor 0.258 0.098* 0.168*** 0.191**
(0.166) (0.054) (0.059) (0.086)
Diploma 0.154 -0.022 0.084 0.067
(0.172) (0.061) (0.060) (0.088)
Any certificate 0.035 0.014 0.022 0.002
(0.134) (0.048) (0.047) (0.068)
Year 12 0.113 0.066 0.028 -0.033
(0.134) (0.058) (0.062) (0.090)
Extroversion (Std.) -0.051 -0.013 -0.010 -0.006
(0.045) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026)
Agreeableness (Std.) -0.060 0.011 -0.024 -0.035
(0.050) (0.020) (0.021) (0.031)
Conscientiousness (Std.) 0.017 -0.009 0.022 0.009
(0.051) (0.018) (0.019) (0.029)
Emotional stability (Std.) -0.028 -0.015 -0.016 -0.029
(0.044) (0.020) (0.022) (0.033)
Openess (Std.) 0.068 0.001 0.002 0.033
(0.052) (0.019) (0.020) (0.030)
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Table A3 (continued): Determinants of Savings Rate, Unconditional Quantile
Regression (Coefficients and Standard Errors)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75
Partner characteristics
Age 0.005 -0.009** -0.001 0.002
(0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Ever divorced -0.179 -0.031 -0.052 -0.040
(0.110) (0.053) (0.054) (0.081)
Postgrad degree 0.139 0.090 0.314*** 0.183
(0.189) (0.074) (0.081) (0.137)
Grad. dipl./cert. 0.005 0.015 0.146** -0.033
(0.144) (0.064) (0.071) (0.104)
Bachelor -0.115 0.005 0.156*** 0.066
(0.130) (0.056) (0.059) (0.092)
Diploma -0.048 -0.071 0.074 0.050
(0.165) (0.059) (0.062) (0.094)
Any cert. -0.132 -0.068 -0.007 -0.088
(0.124) (0.047) (0.047) (0.068)
Year 12 -0.188 -0.026 -0.011 0.021
(0.148) (0.058) (0.060) (0.087)
Extroversion (Std.) 0.029 -0.007 0.014 0.038
(0.034) (0.016) (0.017) (0.025)
Agreeableness (Std.) -0.108** -0.008 -0.014 -0.060*
(0.053) (0.020) (0.021) (0.031)
Conscientiousness (Std.) -0.014 0.012 0.008 -0.027
(0.043) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028)
Emotional stability (Std.) 0.072* 0.034* 0.020 0.028
(0.042) (0.019) (0.019) (0.029)
Openess (Std.) 0.017 -0.013 -0.009 0.014
(0.044) (0.019) (0.020) (0.030)
Year: 2010 -0.630*** -0.269*** -0.304*** -0.385***
(0.077) (0.031) (0.032) (0.048)
Constant 0.775*** 0.872*** 0.446*** 0.628***
(0.278) (0.112) (0.119) (0.171)
Observations 3,795 3,795 3,795 3,795
Note: ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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